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1 Introduction
One of the perceived strengths of randomisation
as an approach to evaluation is the way it
addresses bias (Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer
2007), which has become increasingly important
in an era of evidence-based policymaking and
results-based management (e.g. DFID 2014).
Tools such as systematic reviews posit an implicit
hierarchy of evidence, based at least in part on
risk of bias (Phillips et al. 2009). Since much of the
evidence for effectiveness used by policymakers
comes from evaluation (see Pritchett 2002), it is
appropriate to address the prevalence of bias and
reflect on possible causes. In this article we ask
how, to what extent, and why different forms of
bias occur in impact evaluations. First, we discuss
the fragility of statistical analyses in policy
contexts and the problem of false positives (the
claim that an intervention produces a statistically
significant effect when it does not). We then look
at technical solutions to the problem of bias in the
form of ‘risk-of-bias’ tools. We argue that one of
the main weaknesses of these tools is the way they
focus on internal bias, rather than considering the
processes and contexts where evaluation takes
place, for example the political economy of the
impact evaluation marketplace and the way
development evaluators are positioned within this.
To balance the first section on quantitative
analysis, we look next at types of bias within
qualitative analysis. We then explain how
delinquent organisational isomorphism can lead
to the performance of evaluations that are by
intention and design likely to be biased. We
explore how well-intentioned evaluators manage
the cognitive dissonance that occurs from the
disjunction between the precept of neutral
evaluation and the ‘incredible’ beliefs (Manski
2011) entailed by these claims. In the penultimate
section we look at possible ways to address bias in
evaluation. Finally, we draw some conclusions and
sound warning notes for those looking for wholly
technical solutions.
2 Bias in statistical analysis
It seems seldom understood how fragile even the
most basic quantitative analyses can be (cf Manski
2007), but it is easy to demonstrate: ‘[W]hy Most
Published Research Findings Are False’, as
Ioannidis (2005) puts it. Most evaluations can be
posed as tests of hypotheses – specifically that an
intervention had a measureable beneficial effect.
In current statistical practice this will be cast as a
null hypothesis that the intervention had no
effect, and an alternate hypothesis that it had a
sufficiently beneficial effect that outweighs the
costs and adverse effects. As is well known this can
result in two types of error (see Table 1) – a Type I
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error when the null hypothesis is true but is
rejected, and a Type II error when the alternate
hypothesis is true but the null is not rejected (i.e.
the alternate is rejected). The former may result
in errors of commission – engaging in
interventions which have not been properly shown
to be effective, while the latter results in errors of
omission – failing to engage in interventions
which are in fact beneficial but have been
rejected. Conventionally, science aimed to
minimise the chance of Type I errors (implicitly
minimising the chance of doing things that were
not beneficial and might in fact be harmful).
However, as is well known, this procedure raises
the chance of making Type II errors – thereby
failing to do beneficial things. The core problem is
that policy science (and policy) has a pro-action
bias, inducing bias in favour of positive findings.1
We argue next that because there are often
strong pressures, for example from activist
politicians, social entrepreneurs, or ambitious
policy researchers, practice is in fact more
oriented to avoiding Type II errors than Type I.
On the academic front this arises because
negative or null findings are harder to publish,
while on the political or economic fronts it is
because doing nothing is seldom politically or
entrepreneurially rewarding. Thus it is often
more important to ‘find a positive result’ or a big
(if not particularly statistically significant) effect
size than to properly discuss the limitations and
uncertainties that characterise the work.2
As several recent authors have emphasised,
modern statistical practice gives rise to
unexpectedly high probabilities of false positives
– rejecting the null in favour of the alternate
hypotheses (Wacholder et al. 2004; Ioannidis
2005; Christley 2010). This arises because of
multiple testing (running many analyses), data
mining and model polishing (with different
variables, data sets, sub-samples, estimation
methods and specifications), and can be
understood by considering the likely incidence of
false positives. Suppose that a population of
analyses (varying over the range of factors just
mentioned) has a probability (Pr) of true
positives3 of a coefficient of sufficient size to
warrant the intervention, then we can calculate
the probability that a positive finding is true
using the conventional hypothesis testing
framework as follows. Generally a finding is
accepted as statistically significant if only 1 in 20
positive findings are likely to occur by chance
(i.e. the 95 per cent confidence level, expressed
as alpha = 0.05 (1 – 0.95)). At the same time it is
important that the finding should have sufficient
power to fail to reject the alternate hypothesis;
thus it is expected that in most cases a rejection
of the null when the null is true at 95 per cent
confidence should be associated with an 80 per
cent chance that the null will be rejected when
the alternate is true. There can be many cases
when the null is false but is not rejected; the
power of a test is the complement of the
probability of a false negative (beta) – i.e.
statistical power is 1 – beta. It can be shown that
the probability of false positives (the probability
that the post test result is true or the positive
predictive value (PPV) of the test) is given by the
formula (Maniadis, Tufano and List 2014):4,5
Figure 1 shows the graph of this function; clearly
the probability of a true positive rises with both
the frequency of true positives (or the expectation
that the treatment has an effect) and the
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Table 1 Evaluation findings and the real state of the world
State of the world
Evaluation finding No effect Beneficial effect
No effect Type II error (β)
Truth False negative
Error of omission




4 Camfield IDSB45.6.qxd  16/10/2014  13:03  Page 50
statistical power of the study. Many studies have
(surprisingly) low power (Walker et al. 2013). Since
generally we do not know the frequency of true
positives for social and economic interventions the
appropriate value of Pr will be subjective. Here,
the politics of intervention advocacy and
performance is likely to shape expectations, and
will be different for different actors. Common
views of effectiveness will be strongly shaped by
stakeholder interests and are likely to be far from
objective. Assigning a prior probability of success
to a contested intervention of no more than 0.5
seems reasonable in the absence of any objective
information to support the assignation of a higher
value. At this prior probability (Pr = 0.5) a low
powered study could give false positives in more
than 20 per cent of studies. This may not seem
unreasonable, although it might be hypothesised
that far fewer interventions are in fact likely to be
successful, until one considers the effect of study
bias.
If there is bias in the evaluation study such that
a fraction of u studies (or analyses within a
study) produce positive results when they should
not, the formula becomes: 
This function is graphed for various levels of
power and bias in Figure 2, which shows that if
only 50 per cent of studies are biased so that they
have a false positive finding, then almost 40 per
cent of studies with high power will produce false
positives. For studies with low power, even a
modest frequency of a biased study yields a
meaningful (> 40 per cent) probability of a false
positive. For more unexpected or controversial
interventions with say a 20 per cent chance of
being successful (which are perhaps more likely
to attract attention and publication) the
probability of false positives can be 50 per cent
for unbiased studies with low power (0.2). The
prevalence of bias (u in the above function) is of
course debatable, but it is surprising how
common-but-questionable-practices of data
analysis can readily generate a high value (see
Simmons, Nelson and Simonsohn 2011 for a
simulation study, and John, Loewenstein and
Prelec 2012 for some empirical evidence). These
phenomena are also likely causes of the ‘decline
effect’ when scientific claims receive decreasing
support over time (Schooler 2011), and explain
the need for replication studies to be more highly
powered than the original (Button et al. 2013).
Low powered evaluations which produce false
positives entail wasted effort in investing (more)
in interventions that are not warranted, and
investing less in the search for alternatives in the
mistaken view that the intervention works – that
is, in evaluation failure. In the following section
we look at tools for managing risk of bias in the
systematic review of evaluation results to see the
extent to which they can address these challenges.
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3 Tools for managing risk of bias within
systematic reviews
Bias is understood within evaluation research as
systematic deviation of results from what they
should be. Most types of intervention, for
example microcredit, have been evaluated in
multiple studies which give differing results. For
this reason systematic reviews (SRs) are
recommended to synthesise diverse sources of
evidence and generate reliable conclusions about
the value of an intervention. In much of the SR
literature freedom from bias arises through
methodological rigour, reflected in the elevation
of randomised controlled trials (RCTs) to the
‘Gold Standard’. The RCT is placed at the top of
a hierarchy of evidence (Phillips et al. 2009) with
non-experimental methods ranked below RCTs
and qualitative evidence either excluded from or
ranked at the bottom; see for example Table 2.
However, much medical, natural and especially
social science does not or cannot adopt RCTs, and
even if they could, they are not free from bias
either (the Cochrane Collaboration (2011)
identifies selection, performance, attrition,
detection and reporting biases as characteristic of
RCTs). Alternative frameworks are therefore
emerging based on typologies or matrices that
judge evidence on the basis of its appropriateness
to the research question, and according to its own
methodology (see Petticrew and Roberts 2006). In
the context of systematic reviews, it is argued
that for studies to yield credible causal inference
they need to be free from biases (as well as
methodologically rigorous). Numerous risk-of-
bias assessment tools have been developed
examining the main identification assumptions
underpinning the validity of quantitative studies
(reviewed in Duvendack et al. 2012) with separate
tools available to appraise the validity of
qualitative evidence (summarised in Walker et al.
2013). These tools play important roles in the
systematic review process as they ensure only
high-quality studies are synthesised. Conversely
they can exclude relevant evidence, which might
limit our understanding of particular topics,
albeit that this ‘discarded’ information could only
be credibly included in qualitative synthesis.
Often scales are used in this process (e.g. the
Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods) but many
(including the Cochrane Collaboration)
discourage the use of such scales (Cochrane
Collaboration 2011: chapter 8.5). This led to the
development of alternative approaches such as
the weight of evidence (WoE) tool (EPPI-Centre
2010). WoE guides the assessment of each piece
of evidence according to its methodological
quality, methodological relevance or
appropriateness, and topic relevance (whether
the focus of the research enables the review
question to be answered).
Typically these quality appraisal methods only
deal with a small number of biases we are likely
to encounter, typically focusing on obvious biases
from weak study designs and estimation
strategies. We suggest that these approaches to
identifying and evaluating biases do not go far
enough and that we need to also explore why
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Table 2 ‘Levels of evidence’
Level 1a Systematic review (with homogeneity) of randomised controlled trials (RCTs)
Level 1b Individual RCT (with narrow confidence interval)
Level 1c All-or-none studies
Level 2a Systematic review (with homogeneity) of cohort studies
Level 2b Individual cohort study (including low quality RCT; e.g. <80 per cent follow-up)
Level 2c ‘Outcomes’ research; ecological studies
Level 3a Systematic reviews (with homogeneity) of case-control studies
Level 3b Individual case-control study
Level 4 Case series (and poor quality cohort and case-control studies)
Level 5 Expert opinion without explicit critical appraisal, or based on physiology, bench research or ‘first principles’
Source Adapted from Phillips et al. (2009).
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these biases exist and are allowed to persist. We
do this by looking at the way people process
information, and how information is generated
and interpreted in the light of particular roles
and relationships (for example, as an
organisation’s client, as a funded researcher, or as
a member of a particular disciplinary grouping).
Understanding the contexts in which bias is likely
to occur may overcome a fundamental attribution
fallacy – that results are due to internal (to the
evaluation) factors rather than the context in
which evaluations take place. We propose that
research designs and methods of analysis are far
more prone to bias and error than the evaluation
industry likes to admit. These problems can, we
argue, be attributed to the competitive context of
policy analysis and the socialisation of policy
analysts which leads them to minimise the gap
between evaluation precepts and practices. In
doing this we propose that theories of
inappropriate, even delinquent, organisational
isomorphism (after DiMaggio and Powell 1983)
and of cognitive dissonance and motivated
reasoning (after Kunda 1990) illuminate the
reasons for evaluation failures, and may indicate
ways to avoid them. While natural science is also
characterised by practices which yield false
results, poor practice in statistical and qualitative
analyses thrives in evaluation environments
which aspire to scientific rigour but fail to
practice the most elementary procedures which
characterise science, namely replication, restudy
and revisit (Camfield and Palmer-Jones 2013a).
4 Bias in qualitative analysis
Bias is not restricted to quantitative evaluations.
Further evidence of bias and its appearance in
qualitative and mixed methods studies are
discussed next. Qualitative research is subject to
multiple cognitive and behavioural biases which
are common to all forms of research, but perhaps
more visible in qualitative. It is also particularly
vulnerable to political and economic pressures, as
discussed in the next section, as qualitative
research within evaluation is typically associated
with learning and aims to be exploratory and
formative (e.g. ‘developmental evaluation’,
Patton 2010). However, qualitative researchers do
not work with a blank sheet – they have (and will
be seen to have) their positionalities, which frame
what they ‘see’ and what it is possible for them to
see. Next we discuss different forms of bias (see
Table 3) which we categorise as empirical,
researcher, methodological and contextual.
4.1 Empirical biases
The way that evaluators engage with data is
shaped by common cognitive biases. These are
tendencies to think in particular ways which can
lead people to make consistently poor judgements.
One common bias is a tendency to see a pattern
where there isn’t, an example of which is the
‘gambler’s fallacy’ (Tversky and Kahneman 1971),
which causes people to over-interpret noticeable
effects. Availability bias causes people to
overestimate the probability of events associated
with memorable or vivid occurrences such as
sudden financial success. Other biases affect
people’s ability to assess causal relations, for
example attribution bias where people see causes
in internal characteristics rather than external
circumstances. One example of this is where
people are more likely to attribute change to
specific events or actors than processes unfolding
slowly over time (what Braudel (1958) called
histoire événementielle rather than longue durée). Self-
serving or self-importance biases may cause actors
to overestimate their own contribution to social
change relative to, for example domestic political
processes – something that is true of agencies as
well as individuals (Babcock and Loewenstein
1997). This means that respondents’ narratives
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Table 3 Types of bias: a partial list
Empirical Forms of cognitive bias such as sensitivity to patterns, attribution error, self-importance, halo effect
Researcher Allegiance or experimenter bias, conservative bias, standpoint or positionality, similar person bias
Methodological Availability bias, diplomatic bias, courtesy bias, exposure bias, bias caused through multiple 
mediation and distance from data generation
Contextual Friendship bias, pro-project bias
Source Authors’ own.
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cannot be treated as literal truth as they
represent particular perspectives on events and
processes and are further shaped by the way they
were elicited.
4.2 Researcher biases
Researchers may have allegiance biases where
their attachment to a particular theory causes
them to discount (or ignore) other plausible
explanations for similar phenomena (more
generally known as ‘experimenter bias’ –
Rosenthal 1966). Savage (2005) reanalysed
archived qualitative data from Goldthorpe and
Lockwood’s study of car assembly workers at the
Vauxhall factory in Luton (1962–3) where they
tested the ‘affluent worker’ hypothesis by taking
highly-paid workers as a ‘critical case’ to
investigate whether everyone was becoming
middle class. They concluded that this wasn’t the
case and Savage (2005: 39) suggests that this was
because they had fitted their data into a
particular typology which closed off alternative
interpretations. Evaluators may also experience
conservative bias where they are slow to revise
their beliefs because they overweight prior
evidence relative to new information.
The importance of what is often called perspective,
standpoint (Harding 1987), or positionality (see
also Sen 1993), illustrated by Savage’s example,
is something qualitative researchers are mostly
aware of. Many qualitative texts include slightly
awkward confessional passages (cf Thody 2006:
28) that locate researchers in relation to
characteristics relevant to their study such as
race or class. There may, however, be limited
consideration of the positionality of their
respondents, leading to a relative neglect of
respondent biases. Other biases that occur
during the research process include similar
person bias, where researchers find those
accounts more persuasive which come from
people whom they see as similar, charismatic
(cf the halo effect), and whom they have had
personal contact with (exposure bias). As these
biases are subconscious they may not be reported
in reflexive accounts of the research process.
4.3 Methodological biases
A key problem in evaluation research is courtesy
bias where respondents tend to tell researchers
what they (are perceived to) want to hear (or
what the respondents would like them to
communicate; see Bavinck (2008) in relation to
post-Tsunami India). Bakewell (2007: 230)
describes how ‘an assessment by an NGO focused
on water is very likely to identify water problems
that need to be addressed. Respondents will
rapidly understand what the NGO’s interest is
and the conversation will drift towards water
issues… [this] means that the data collected will
reflect a particular picture that the respondents
want to show in this particular context’. This
may be compounded by diplomatic bias, where
because the researcher is polite or timid they are
reluctant to probe or challenge anomalous
responses (Chambers 1983 in White and Phillips
2012: 24).
There are also processes specific to qualitative
research that may increase the possibility of bias,
for example the additional mediation of the data
caused by interpreters, transcription and
translation (Temple, Edwards and Alexander
2006), the variable quality of note-taking and the
difficulty of capturing embodied knowledge (i.e.
the knowledge gained by being present at the
interview). Another problem is that much
qualitative analysis is essentially ‘tertiary’ rather
than secondary – done by people who neither
carried out nor planned the fieldwork (cf White
and Masset’s (2007) use of data from a
qualitative study of traditional beliefs related to
child and maternal malnutrition to explain the
lack of impact from the Bangladesh Integrated
Nutrition Project, which might have resulted in
bias if they had treated the data less carefully).
4.4 Contextual biases
Social and political pressures are highlighted by
Boaz and Ashby (2003: 5) who note ‘accusations
of both conscious and unconscious bias in the
peer review of research proposals, with reviewers
favouring friends, protégés and those of like
mind while pronouncing adversely on rivals or
those with whom they are intellectually at odds’.
This bias extends to the operation of steering
committees and advisory groups during the
research process which ‘may sometimes be less
to do with methodological quality than about
ensuring that the project meets the
requirements of the sponsor’ (ibid.), limiting
their ability to reduce bias. The bias may partly
arise from relationships developing between
evaluators and project staff; what White and
Phillips (2012) call friendship bias (or more
cynically, contract renewal bias), which then
affects their independence in evaluation.6 This
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can also happen at a subconscious level if project
staff become the evaluator’s ‘in-group’ as there is
a known cognitive bias towards seeing positive
influences from individuals belonging to an in-
group rather than an out-group (Fosterling 2001
in White and Phillips 2012). Copestake (2013)
argues that the focus within impact evaluation
on conventional sources of bias such as statistical
sampling and selection, rather than less
quantifiable ones such as pro-project bias, may
be a cognitive bias in itself – towards the known
over the unknown (cf conservative bias).
5 The politics of evaluation – cognitive
dissonance and organisational isomorphism
Although most researchers are portrayed as
blind to their cognitive biases, except perhaps for
those who deliberately engage in fraud, we argue
that biases are not ‘innocent’ or ‘natural’, and
that their occurrence and effects may be
understood and explained through sociological
analysis of the context of evaluations. Recent
calls for more evaluation in development
(Savedoff, Levine and Birdsall 2005) and more
learning from development evaluations
(Pritchett, Woolcock and Andrews 2013) are
poorly based in the history of development which
is replete with the existence of earlier
evaluations whose results were largely ignored
(for example, the major post-Second World War
projects such as the groundnuts scheme in
Tanzania (Hogendorn and Scott 1981) and the
Niger Valley Project (Baldwin 1957)). Social cost-
benefit analysis and monitoring and evaluation
were widely applied in development project
planning and evaluation from the 1960s through
to the present (see, for example, chapter 2 of
ADB n.d.). More recently participatory appraisal
and evaluation have come to characterise the
field (Reitbergen-McCracken and Narayan
1998). So if we are to learn to do better
evaluations and to practice evidence-based
policymaking we need to understand why earlier
calls for and practices of evaluation have not
yielded robust practices.
First we need to recognise development
evaluation failure – evaluations are conducted
but they fail to bring about the sorts of
sequenced improvements in interventions that
have been seen in the medical and technology
fields. This is partly perhaps because the model
of evaluation does not fit the field of
development in the same way as the field of
business. In the latter, in many but not all
circumstances (see Piketty 2014), competition
finds out weaknesses, so that evaluation
practices which do not promote competitiveness
are weeded out. While some authors put this
down to a lack of genuine interest in evaluation
(Pritchett 2002), others have attributed it to
political economy explanations that characterise
evaluations in terms of principal-agent problems
(Andersen and Broegaard 2012). These
approaches tend to depict the actual actors in
development evaluations as dumb bearers of
external logics rather than consciously
deliberative choosers of their actions in the
evaluation field (and elsewhere). Thus we seek to
characterise the evaluation field and show how it
is that intelligent, educated actors come to
produce evaluations that often bear tenuous
relation to external reality.
Evaluation professionals have long recognised the
importance of politics in evaluation and its
potential for inducing bias (Datta 2011; House
1973). By its nature evaluation concerns material
and financial resources, as well as their valuation,
which are often disbursed by governments, or
other entities not subject to market discipline.7
Not surprisingly, organisations and people
compete to appropriate them (as discussed for
example in the ‘rent-seeking’ and ‘corruption’
literatures (Krueger 1974)). Organisations and
individuals with major interests in interventions
(as funders, suppliers, demanders, executers,
resisters, evaluators, by-standers, etc.), often
conceptualised as stakeholders, have multiple,
diverse, and generally conflicting interests. They
are likely to invest resources in the initiation,
conduct, and outcomes of evaluation to ensure
they better suit their needs. Medical evaluations
have, according to House (2008) been captured
by supplier interests, neutralising regulators and
‘threaten[ing] the integrity of the evaluation
field’ (p.416). For this reason Datta (2011) calls
for ‘political toolkits’ for evaluators and holds up
some evaluations of contested policies as
‘exemplary’ (e.g. Brandon et al. 2010).
5.1 Evaluation implementation failure
As shown above, evaluation has been common in
development in various forms dating back to the
colonial period, with varying degrees of success.
The recent emphasis on more and better
evaluation speaks to widely perceived failures,
which can be characterised as implementation
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failure (Pritchett et al. 2013). Development
organisations are induced in various ways to
adopt ‘best practices’, generally seen as those
practised in Western capitalist firms, but these
do not function in the intended ways. Hence,
these organisations engage in evaluation, but the
evaluations are not those that are intended.
These problems are not restricted to developing
countries, of course, and can be found widely
elsewhere. For example, among non-profits in
developed countries evaluation practices have
become loosely coupled to their ideal design
characteristics (Weick 1974; Ebrahim 2002) so
that organisations are able to control the impacts
of evaluation for their own internal (management)
and external (advertising) purposes.
5.2 Delinquent institutional isomorphism
Notwithstanding Etzioni’s categorisation of
complex organisations in the 1960s into those
which are governed through coercive, utilitarian
and normative mechanisms (Etzioni 1964, 1975),
there has been a strong trend towards more
homogenous forms of organisation (DiMaggio
and Powell 1983) focusing on utilitarian means
of eliciting compliance such as monetary
payments (i.e. emphasising utilitarian means of
gaining compliance to the neglect of, especially,
moral means). These utilitarian forms of
organisation have become increasingly
characteristic of state and civil society
organisations as more activities are contracted
out (subject to market test, value-for-money).
This trend towards homogenisation is termed
organisational isomorphism; organisations
increasingly appear to be governed in similar
ways to those adopted in the private capitalist
sector. For example, development organisations
set up monitoring and evaluation departments
and conduct impact evaluations with the
intention of ‘proving’ their success and
‘improving’ their performance.
In the present context we draw a parallel
between the rational planning procedures
characteristic of business enterprises, including
evaluation, and the adoption of these practices in
development. Non-governmental, community-
based and civil society organisations and their
employees are increasingly subject to Fordist
pressures manifest in evaluation procedures.
However, these tendencies encounter resistance
(cf the ‘politics of evidence’ movement launched
by Eyben and others in 2012; see Eyben 2013).
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) introduced the
terms coercive, mimetic and normative
institutional isomorphisms to describe this
convergence of organisational forms around the
compliance characteristics of capitalist
enterprises: coercive isomorphism where
organisations are forced by resource dependence
to adopt mandated forms; mimetic isomorphism
where organisations voluntarily adopt forms of
organisation which imitate those perceived as
successful such as capitalist enterprises, even
though they operate in different arenas and face
different managerial and organisational issues
and problems; and normative isomorphism where
convergence occurs through professionalisation
(see Section 5.3). Such organisational modelling
can occur, according to DiMaggio and Powell,
through transfer of personnel, or through the
advice of ‘consulting firms or industry trade
associations’ (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Even
though organisations may adopt apparently
similar forms of organisation in order to improve
productivity or efficacy, such transfers of
organisational technology may also in part be
ritualistic, for example embodying attempts at
impression management or legitimisation with
external or internal audiences (DiMaggio and
Powell 1991: 151).8 Normative isomorphism
occurs under the influence of professionalisation
of standards and values, something which is
increasingly happening within evaluation.
Professionalisation, according to DiMaggio and
Powell, takes place as ‘members of an occupation
[struggle] to define the conditions and methods
of their work, to control the “production of
producers”’ (Larson 1977: 49–52, quoted in
DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 152) and to ‘establish
a cognitive base and legitimation for their
occupational autonomy’ (op. cit.: 152). Isomorphic
pressures are intensified by organisational
dependence on non-market resources (resource
dependence).
Evaluation implementation failure can be
explored in terms of delinquent isomorphism
because coercive, mimetic, and even normative
isomorphism provide no guarantee that actual
practices will correspond to their putative
models in institutional contexts far removed
from the originals. As this is both obvious and
well attested in the literatures of development
(see, for example, Ferguson 1990), our interest is
in what motivates the well-intentioned people
who populate these delinquent forms.
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5.3 Motivated reasoning – cognitive dissonance,
self-serving and other biases
How organisations are induced to adopt forms
and practices for which the institutional supports
are not present should be a subject for empirical
investigation. Pritchett and co-workers seem to
attribute these institutional failures of
isomorphic mimicry to what they term
premature load-bearing due to ‘the routine
placement of highly unrealistic expectations on
fledging systems’ (2013: 1), for example a
situation where a small NGO might nonetheless
be pressured to adopt an elaborate M&E system.
This begs the question of who places these
expectations and why they are accepted. The
argument of this section is that there are
powerful incentives for evaluation researchers to
produce positive or negative results that further
their interests – mainly their careers, but also
their ideologies, pet projects and so on. This
results in self-serving bias which partially
accounts for the biases listed in Table 3. We are
not arguing that people are self-consciously,
cognitively, deliberately, self-serving, rather that
these dubious practices become embodied
(Merleau-Ponty 1942) through processes of
structuration (Giddens 1984). Thus people come
to believe the truth of their statistical tests, and
are genuinely puzzled, even outraged, when
things go wrong (for example, failure, in the
longer run, of replications). Specifically, and
simplifying hugely, a concatenation of factors
resulted in the dominance of Null Hypothesis
Testing (NHT) in computational social (and
natural) sciences which, together with the
dictates of career advancement among
academics – the opinion leaders in these fields –
seemed to justify data mining, model polishing
and HARKing (Hypothesising After the Results
are Known), as well as the occasional
falsification (Ioannidis 2005). These factors were
included in the synthesis of Fisher’s and the
Neymann-Pearson methods that became the
normative ‘hypothetico-deductive method’ of
positivist, empiricist sciences (Fay 1975).
The reasons, it has been suggested, lie in the
structure of rewards among empirical
researchers and journal editors (Mirowski and
Sklivas 1991; Feigenbaum and Levy 1993) and
motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990). For various
reasons the social sciences adopted NHT at the
p<0.05 level or lower, as the requirement for
consideration for publication. As many have
noted, very few papers are published which
report as their main finding the failure to reject
the null hypothesis (Loftus 1991). Thus,
according to this narrative, researchers seek to
publish in high-quality journals and journals
tend to publish research that reports statistically
significant rejections of null hypotheses,
preferably where coefficients imply effects that
are meaningful to policy (i.e. the result implies a
viable policy, or is substantive enough to account
for a phenomenon or warrant the intervention).
Given the remarkably simple task of finding a
statistically significant rejection of the null
hypothesis in order to qualify for publication in
prominent journals, it is not surprising that
optimising individuals would seek to both
conduct their analyses in order to achieve this
result and to persuade themselves that what they
had done was legitimate. While attribution of
unreliable results to cognitive bias (confirmation
bias) seems to be neutral with respect to blame,
it begs the question of where these biases come
from. The characterisation of the problem of
false positives (and sometimes false negatives) as
due to biases avoids the question of inadvertent
malfeasance.
6 Strategies to address bias within evaluation
To avoid ending on too bleak a note, the final
section describes some of the mechanisms we can
use to reduce unacknowledged bias in impact
evaluation. The first task is to increase
acknowledgement of the likelihood of bias, to
have more declarations of interests, broadly
conceived, and to address the systemic pressures
that encourage bias (Pashler and Wagenmakers
2012: 529).9 However, we argue that the problem
of bias within evaluation is systemic, embodied,
and, for the most part, unconscious, inscribed by
the context of socialisation and education, and
exacerbated in (but not restricted to) the
environment of neoliberalism. Many solutions
have been proposed to address them (see Nosek,
Spies and Motyl 2012) so here we rehearse some
actions that address personal activities rather
than structural features that reduce the
unacknowledged bias in evaluation. The
underlying principles for tackling bias at the level
of the individual evaluation are being systematic,
transparent and reflexive, and we elaborate on
the implications of these next. Being systematic
involves having (and publishing)10 a clear
research plan outlining the nature and sources of
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data and specifying the design of instruments and
protocols for fieldwork and analysis. This reduces
the likelihood of researchers going on ‘fishing
trips’ (something that is now possible also with
qualitative data using Computerised Qualitative
Data Analysis Software). While the more
inductive nature of qualitative research makes it
difficult to specify hypotheses in advance,
concerns in relation to this can be allayed
through transparency: giving full methodological
accounts that include an account of the analysis,
and archiving data to potentially enable these
analyses to be ‘replicated’ (see Irwin 2013, for
reuse of secondary qualitative research data).
Reflexivity is important in considering how the
evaluator will conduct fieldwork and interviews
and analyse data in a way that conveys
authenticity and trustworthiness. Patton (2002: 2)
argues that ‘the quality of qualitative data
depends to a great extent on the methodological
skill, sensitivity, and integrity of the evaluator’,
which may be belied by the apparent simplicity
of the methods (he reminds us that ‘systematic
and rigorous observation involves far more than
just being present and looking around’). For that
reason ‘generating useful and credible
qualitative findings through observation,
interviewing, and content analysis requires
discipline, knowledge, training, practice,
creativity, and hard work’ (ibid.). However,
reflexivity must be demonstrated not claimed,
for example by acknowledging interests,
including in the field materials, and reporting
your experiences, thoughts and feelings,
including how your observations may have
affected the observed and how you may have
been affected by what you have observed.
More formal mechanisms for ensuring research
quality and reducing bias include peer review and
ethical codes. While peer review may identify
gross examples of bias the peer reviewers rarely
see the data and may well be biased themselves
(Wilson et al. 1993; House of Commons 2011).
Few if any social science journals require authors
to declare their interests, let alone reviewers, and
not even medical and science journals conceive
interests more broadly (for example, interests in
particular methods, conceptual models, or causal
pathways, interventions, and so on). Grey
literature and working papers may not receive
the same level of scrutiny, but are still influential
as, for example, Davis (2013) illustrates for Sachs
and Warner’s 1997 working paper on economic
growth in Africa. Restudies or revisits to sites of
previous studies are another way to identify gross
examples of bias, or more likely, moments when
the researcher’s positionality and the way in
which it interacted with the positionality of their
participants took the research in an implausible
direction (for example, the debate between
Freeman and Mead over adolescent sexuality in
Samoa). However, economists still seem in ‘states
of denial’ (Cohen 2001) with regard to the value
of replication in their discipline (Duvendack and
Palmer-Jones 2013), although there may be some
movement in this regard (Brown, Cameron and
Wood 2014; Ioannidis and Doucouliagos 2013). In
other work we have emphasised that research
ethics extends ‘beyond the subject’ (Camfield and
Palmer-Jones 2013b) to include the obligation to
do non-trivial and beneficent research; to
maintain and share accounts of research practice
which affect the conclusions that can be drawn
from the data; and to be clear with funders about
the open-ended nature of research and
researchers’ additional responsibilities to society,
and peers, as well as research participants. Thus,
biased evaluation (research) will in the end bring
evaluation (research) into disrepute (Ioannidis
2012), as of course happened with previous
incarnations, for example cost-benefit analysis
(Ackerman and Heinzerling 2004).
7 Conclusion
We have argued that bias in evaluation is all too
easy to achieve given the normative practices of
quantitative and qualitative social sciences.
These practices are reinforced by the operation
of cognitive biases that act to prevent
psychological discomfort through the processes
of motivated reasoning and are common in the
evaluation context of delinquent organisational
isomorphism. Unlike natural science (Merton
1942, 1973, although see Ioannidis 2012), social
science is rarely self-correcting, at least in the
short run. Replication is disfavoured even for
entirely computational papers (Duvendack and
Palmer-Jones 2013) and generally not considered
possible in qualitative research, although revisits
and restudies are partial equivalents (Camfield
and Palmer-Jones 2013a).
Politically motivated policies are initiated and
promoted by headline grabbing sound-bites and
simplifying political advocacy (Cable 2004);
powerful bandwagon effects come into play.
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Development activists seek to expand the scale
or scope of an intervention, careerist authors and
editors are reluctant to write or publish articles
which challenge well-established and iconic
papers, and evaluation researchers may not have
the time or motivation to publish. For these
reasons it can take years or even decades before
a more realistic assessment prevails. One might
suggest that participation (and participatory
research), microfinance and RCTs of social
interventions are exemplars of such trajectories.
In their recent incarnations starting respectively
in the 1970s, 1980s and 2000s there has been
discovery, sigmoid growth and more recently
push-back (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Mosse
2001; Duvendack et al. 2011 (on microfinance);
Shaffer 2011). In some cases similar
interventions have been through the same cycle
more than once.11 The same should not be true of
evaluation which could potentially save
development from endlessly repeating its history.
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Notes
1 This is, of course, not always true; Pritchett
(2002) discusses logics of evaluations with
different outcomes. Contesting views about
this reflect in part strong motives for one or
other type of finding.
2 Vide the perhaps apocryphal demand from
President Johnson to his advisers: ‘Ranges are
for cattle. Give me a number’ (quoted in
Manski 2007).
3 Understanding can be motivated by a medical
example: suppose a clinician has to interpret
a symptom which has very high frequency
among those with a very rare disease but also
occurs at modest frequency in the population
at large, and has to decide whether to
prescribe a treatment that works well for the
truly sick but has adverse side-effects on those
with the symptom but not the disease. Failure
to treat has adverse effect for the few who are
afflicted, but treatment of the well also has
adverse effects. The large number of false
positives that are likely to occur leads to the
requirement of high confidence that the
patient truly has the disease. 
4 Similar formulae are given in Ioannidis (2005)
and Moonesinghe, Khoury and Janssens
(2007), drawing on Bayes Law. In their cases
Pr is substituted by the odds of true positives
(R) rather than probabilities and the
formulae adjusted accordingly. Note that
these authors also use the more conventional
alpha = 0.95 to express the confidence level of
the null hypothesis, as do we.
5 Pr = prior probability that the alternate is
true; alpha = 95 per cent confidence level, i.e.
= 0.05 (1 – 0.95); beta = probability of a false
negative; PPV = Positive Predictive Value –
the post study probability that a positive
finding is in fact true; u = bias.
6 The extent to which this is the norm can be
seen in the hostile reaction to Mosse (2005)
which project staff felt lacked the collegial
and consensual approach they would expect
from an evaluator (Eyben 2009). 
7 We locate our necessarily truncated discussion
in the arena of policy science, but
acknowledge that it draws on political
economy and the sociology of science. 
8 The proliferation of microfinance schemes
offered by civil society organisations under
pressure from both clients and funders conveys
the message that ‘the sleepy non-profit ….
Was now becoming business-minded’ (Powell
1988, referred to in DiMaggio and Powell
1991), thereby appealing to the dominant
neoliberal ethos of our times.
9 ‘[H]ypercompetitive academic climate and an
incentive scheme that provides rich rewards
for overselling one’s work and few rewards at
all for caution and circumspection’ (ibid.: 528).
10 As now required for experimental procedures
for RCTs and for systematic reviews to avoid
both ‘file drawer problems’ (Rosenthal 1979)
and Questionable Research Practices (John et
al. 2012).
11 For example, community development
(Holdcroft 1984) and RCTs of social
interventions (Campbell and Russo 1998;
Heckman and Smith 1995). 
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